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1. Chinese Abstract
本計畫利用一個獨占競爭的二國二財一般
均衡模型，採用事後(ex post)代工的概
念，研究政府是否應補貼海外行銷以及補
貼能否提高海外行銷。本文証明提高海外
行銷會降低代工產量，提供政府補貼的誘
因。再者，本文發現當海外需求的行銷彈
性以及代工財之邊際損失的邊際變動夠大
時，海外行銷會提高本國福利水準。此外，
本文顯示，若海外需求的行銷彈性以及海
外需求的之斜率的行銷彈性的加總小於一
時，補貼會提高最適海外行銷水準。
關鍵詞：事後代工、海外行銷、補貼、獨
占競爭
Abstract
This paper examines whether the 
governments should subsidize overseas brand 
creation and whether subsidies could raise 
overseas brand creation by using a 
two-country, two-good general equilibrium 
model with ex post subcontracting, in which 
monopolistic competition is taken into 
account.  This paper has shown that 
overseas brand creation definitely harms the 
production of subcontracting, which gives 
governments an incentive to subsidize.  In 
addition, it has found that when the brand 
creation elasticity of overseas demand and
the marginal change of the marginal loss 
from subcontracted product are large enough, 
overseas brand creation improves the host 
country’s welfare.  Furthermore, it has also 
demonstrated that subsidies raise the optimal 
level of overseas brand creation, if the sum of 
the brand creation elasticity of overseas 
demand and that of the slope of overseas 
demand is no greater than one.
Keywords: Ex Post Subcontracting, Overseas 
Brand Creation, Subsidies, 
Monopolistic Competition.
2. Introduction and purposes
Overseas subcontracting is commonly 
employed in developing countries.  For a 
specific example, Taiwan is the world’s 
largest subcontractor in many industries, such 
as PCs and semiconductor foundry.  Earlier 
literature on subcontracting includes Kamien, 
Li, and Samet (1989), Lewis and Sappington 
(1991), Spiegel (1993), and Taylor and 
Wiggins (1997).  In particular, Spiegel 
(1993) points out, when there occurs 
considerable uncertainty about either the 
demand for downstream product or the 
marketing cost, which can be learned only 
when they actually set their downstream 
quantity, the firms may wish to postpone 
their subcontracting decisions ex post.   
Spiegel further argues that although contracts 
are usually set in the first stage while quantity 
and price are determined in the second stage 
in the industrial organization literature, the ex 
post subcontracting is proper and fits the 
reality of subcontracting industry.
Many subcontracting producers in 
developing countries can only export 
subcontracted products due to the lack of 
financial support to conduct overseas brand 
creation.  They often suffers from the risk of 
being taken away the subcontracting task 
suddenly and are forced to drop out of the 
market.  Especially, producers whose only 
3job is to subcontract for foreign producers are 
risk-taking.  Some prime contractors 
perceive subcontracting as an intermediate 
solution for gaining time to set up their own 
supply base, and subcontractors will lose the 
subcontracting contracts immediately while 
losing cost advantage.  Subcontractors could 
survive while losing subcontracting task only 
if they can also sell with own brands overseas.  
This can be seen in the case of the racket 
industry in Taiwan.  Taiwan once was the 
major subcontractor for racket products.  A 
rising cost during 1980s made Taiwan lose 
most of the subcontracting contracts.  The 
only survivor, Kennix, is an international 
brand created by local producer.  This 
example demonstrates the importance of 
creating overseas brand for subcontracting 
producers.  However, the issues on whether 
the governments should subsidize overseas 
brand creation and whether subsidies could 
raise the optimal level of overseas brand 
creation have not been touched upon.
We thus develop a two-country, 
two-commodity general equilibrium model 
with ex post subcontracting, in which 
monopolistic competition is considered, to 
examine the effects of overseas brand 
creation on the subcontracted quantities and 
the welfare as well as the effect of subsidies 
on the optimal level of overseas brand 
creation.  In this paper, we use a rise in 
overseas marketing cost to represent overseas 
brand creation, which can increase firm’s 
overseas demands by enhancing the attraction 
of the host firm’s product to foreign 
consumers.
3. The basic model
Suppose that there are two countries in 
the world: the host country and foreign 
country.  Foreign variables are indicated 
with an asterisk (*).  Each country consists 
of two industries: the differentiated product X
that is produced with increasing-returns to 
scale, and the homogeneous product Y with 
constant-returns to scale technology.  The 
production of differentiated product X
consists of an upstream process and a 
downstream process.  Firms produce and 
subcontract the production of good X in the 
upstream market, while market them in the 
downstream market.  The host country is 
endowed with L units of labor.  The 
representative individual receives only labor 
income, and has the form of Cobb-Douglas 
preference.  The preference can be 
represented by an expenditure function Qxg
Qy1-g V, in which V denotes the utility level, 
Qx is the price index of the differentiated 
good, Qy is the price of good Y, and g (1-g) is 
the share of good X (Y) in consumer’s 
expenditure.  The budget constraint can be 
described as:
,)1( VQQsnAwL yx
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where w represents the wage rate, s denotes 
the specific subsidy rate to overseas brand 
creation, n is the number of variety produced 
in the host country, and A is the level of 
overseas brand creation.  We define that A
is represented by overseas marketing cost. 
The higher the level of A is, the stronger the 
attraction of the brand to foreign consumers 
will be.  The initial value of s is assumed to 
be zero, and the amount of snA represents the 
government’s total amount of subsidies to 
overseas brand creation.
Industry X produces a number of 
varieties of differentiated products, which are 
aggregated by a CES subutility function into 
a composite good.  The price indices of the 
composite good in the host country and 
foreign country are Qx and Qx*, respectively, 
which take the form:
[ ] ,)( )1/(11**1 sss --- += pnnpQx (2a)
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where pz denotes the shadow price of the host 
country’s differentiated good consumed in 
the overseas market, and p represents the 
price ratio of the host country’s differentiated 
good.  In the symmetric equilibrium, the 
differentiated products are sold at the same 
price p and p* in the host and foreign 
countries, respectively.  We assume that 
there is no transport cost while shipping 
products domestically and overseas.  
Variable s, which is greater than one, is the 
elasticity of demand for each differentiated 
product.
Following Stigler and Becker (1977), 
we assume that foreign households have the 
4utility function u*(n*dx*, nz*, Y*), where n*dx*
denotes the aggregate demand for foreign 
differentiated products, and z* is a 
commodity consumed by the household and 
produced by it via a household production 
function.  This production function uses the 
overseas purchase of the host firm’s 
differentiated product xf and overseas brand 
creation A as inputs.  This means that the 
attraction of the host firm’s product to 
foreign consumers goes higher via increasing 
overseas brand creation.  Moreover, we 
assume that the quantity of xf is not zero 
when A equals zero, i.e., the host firms can 
still sell products overseas without brand 
name.  Thus, the household production 
function is specified as follows:
z* = g (A) xf, (3)
where g (0) = 1, ¶ g/¶ A = gA > 0, ¶ 2g/¶ A2 = 
gAA < 0.
Like Stigler and Becker (1977), the 
relationship between the price ratio of host 
firm’s product and its overseas shadow price 
can be derived from equation (3) as:
).(/ Agppz = (4)
Assume that industry Y is perfectly 
competitive, and employs only labor with 
constant-returns to scale technology.  By 
choosing good Y to be the numeraire, the 
price of good Y, Qy, can be normalized to 
unity.  Choosing units such that one unit of 
labor produces one unit of output, the 
zero-profit condition is:
w = Qy º 1. (5)
A two-stage game is constructed in this paper.  
In stage 1, firms engage in a Cournot 
competition in the downstream market.  In 
stage 2, firms sign a subcontracting 
agreement, according to which the host firm 
produces xs units for the foreign country’s 
firm and in return receives a transfer payment 
T.  Following backward induction, the 
analysis begins by considering the decisions 
in stage 2 -- the upstream subcontracting 
stage.  Since firms' downstream quantities
have been given by stage 1, the 
subcontracting moves some production from 
the higher marginal production cost firm to 
the lower marginal production firm to save 
costs.  Through Nash bargaining solution, 
the maximum joint cost saving (i.e., the 
minimum joint upstream cost) is achieved by 
subcontracting, and is split according to each 
one's bargaining power.
The upstream production cost of 
differentiated product X is assumed to use 
only labor with increasing-return to scale, 
and involves a fixed cost a and a constant 
marginal cost b.  The upstream production 
cost can be expressed as:
lx = a + b x, (6)
where lx is the workers employed in 
producing individual firm’s differentiated 
product, and x is the host firm’s downstream 
quantities.
A switching cost occurs when the firm 
takes up subcontracting production.  The 
switching cost is assumed to increase the 
subcontracting firm’s marginal upstream cost 
by fxs for simplicity, in which f is a positive 
constant.  Note that this assumption is 
necessary for deriving an interior solution.  
Otherwise, foreign firm will produce nothing.  
Thus, the subcontracting firm’s upstream 
production cost including the switching cost 
is:
),)(( ssx xxfxl +++= ba (7)
where xs denotes the host firm’s 
subcontracted quantities.
The subcontracted quantity is decided 
by minimizing the two firms’ joint upstream 
production costs as:
,2 *bb =++ sfxfx (8)
where b* represents foreign firm’s constant 
marginal cost in the upstream process.  The 
left-hand side (LHS) of (8) represents the 
marginal subcontracting cost for the host firm, 
while that for foreign firm is on the 
right-hand side (RHS).
The surplus that subcontracting 
production generates, S, is defined as:
).()( * sss xxfxxS +--= bb (9)
The surplus, incurred by the cost saving due 
to subcontracting production minus the 
switching cost, is split according to the 
subcontracting agreement, in which the 
surplus is divided into proportions h and 1-h
for the subcontractor and the consignor.  
The transfer payment from the consignor to 
the subcontractor is a weighted sum of host 
firm’s incremental costs and foreign firm’s 
5cost saving due to subcontracting, which is 
derivable as:
).()( * sss xxfxxS +--= bb (10)
The downstream production costs 
include the cost of a sales network and 
overseas brand creation.  The host firm’s 
profit px is defined as the sum of revenues 
from downstream quantities, transfer 
payments from subcontracting production, 
and government subsidies, after subtracting 
the downstream production costs, the 
upstream production cost, and the switching 
cost for subcontracting.
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where m denotes the cost of sales network 
per unit of downstream quantity.  The first 
four terms on the RHS of (11) represent the 
profits from downstream product, while the 
last term is the profits from subcontracting 
production.
With Cournot quantity competition, the 
host firm’s profit-maximizing condition for 
downstream quantity in the downstream stage 
is:
.0)()
1
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s
(12)
We define the first and second terms on the 
LHS of (12) as the marginal gain from 
downstream product due to a rise in the 
downstream quantity, while the third term as 
the marginal loss from subcontracted product.  
We see from (8) that a marginal increase in 
downstream quantity decreases subcontracted 
quantities.  This will result in the reduction 
in the profits from subcontracting, and then 
make a marginal loss from subcontracted 
product.
From the expenditure functions of the 
host country and foreign country, we can 
derive the following demand functions for 
the host firm’s differentiated product:
),(1 snAwLpQd xx -=
-- gss (13)
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where dx denotes the domestic demand for 
the host firm’s differentiated product.
By equalizing the demand and supply 
of the host firm’s differentiated product, we 
obtain the equilibrium condition as follows:
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Since there is no barrier to entry and 
exit in the differentiated-product industry, a 
zero-profit condition is required in the 
long-run equilibrium.
.0)()()1( 2 =++---- sxfxAsmxpx hba   (16)
We assume that the host country is 
small, implying that it faces a given number 
of foreign differentiated products, and a 
given price ratio of foreign differentiated 
product.  The model consists of (1), (2a), (4), 
(5), (11), (12), (15), and (16).
4. The extended model
To examine the impact of subsidies on 
overseas brand creation, we need an extra 
condition, which endogenizes the optimal 
level of overseas brand creation by 
maximizing the firm’s profits with respect to 
A as:
.1)/11( sxgp Az -=- s (23)
The term on the LHS of (23) represents the 
marginal revenue of overseas brand creation 
MRA, while that on the RHS denotes the 
marginal cost MCA.
Totally differentiating (8), (12), (15), 
(16), and (23), we yield:
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where BA = - (e + f) /A < 0, f = - (¶ gA /¶
A)(A/gA) > 0 represents the brand creation 
elasticity of the slope of overseas demand, 
and let Js denote the determinant coefficient 
matrix in (24).  In addition to the stability 
conditions derived in (17), we derive an extra 
condition Js = -Rn [(-1/p)hf
+(2/x)(1-1/s)]+BAJ < 0 (See Appendix).
5. Concluding remarks
Subcontracting production is a 
commonly used production method in 
developing countries. In general, 
subcontracting producers usually fall short of 
the capability of creating brands overseas.  
This leads to an important question: whether 
the governments should subsidize overseas 
6brand creation.  This paper have examined 
whether the governments should subsidize 
overseas brand creation and whether 
subsidies could raise overseas brand creation 
by using a two-country, two-good general 
equilibrium model with ex post
subcontracting, in which monopolistic 
competition is considered.  We have derived 
several striking results.
Firstly, we have shown that overseas 
brand creation definitely decreases 
subcontracted quantities.  This gives 
governments an incentive to subsidize the 
subcontracting producers such that the firms 
will not be discouraged to engage in overseas 
brand creation.  Secondly, overseas brand 
creation improves (deteriorates) the host 
country’s welfare if the brand creation 
elasticity of overseas demand and the 
marginal change of the marginal loss from 
subcontracted quantity are large (small) 
enough.  The government should subsidize 
overseas brand creation only when it can 
increase the host country’s welfare.  Lastly, 
we have shown that subsidies to overseas 
brand creation would not necessarily raise the 
optimal level of overseas brand creation.  
The optimal level rises if the sum of brand 
creation elasticity of overseas demand and 
that of the slope of overseas demand is no 
greater than one.
6. Self Evaluation
This project has completed all the items 
listed on the proposal.  The results that we 
find are striking.  This project could be 
reedited and submit to academic journals in 
the future.
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